by Donald E. SheppardLed by speculation of which trails Hernando de Soto followed through Alabama, archaeologists have searched for traces of his army's presence there, but to no avail. No trace of DeSoto has ever been found in Alabama despite the fact that his army WAS there for at least six months (The DeSoto Chronicles, referenced herein).
No one doubts that DeSoto found Mabila, the source of the place name Mobile, in Southern Alabama. What historians didn't know until recently was that from there, DeSoto's Army proceeded northward to Chicago.
This Internet Site has described DeSoto's trail to Mabila, in detail, from his landing place at Port Charlotte, Florida. That trail led across Florida and into Alabama, across Georgia and the Carolinas, into parts of Tennessee and Georgia, then back through Alabama to Mabila, just below Prairie Bluff on the Alabama River.
This report contends that landmarks, found along DeSoto's way and described in his people's journals, still exist where they were found in the 1540's. Scientists have never challenged this observation, but, because most cling to the ancient belief that DeSoto landed at Tampa Bay, their supposed DeSoto trails through Alabama and points west are well off-track. Their Alabama entry point for DeSoto's army, alone, is hundreds of miles off the mark. On the positive side, however, some of them have shown interest in the DeSoto tracking method presented here.
In general, previous DeSoto Trail seekers failed to comprehend that distance-measurement was critical to Spanish Conquest. The actual distances between places, along straight lines - measured in Spanish "legal" leagues by pacers and plotted by cartographers - were essential for navigation and eventual land title. By today's standard, there are 2.634 "legal" miles per Spanish "legal" league. Most of America is titled in reference to a grid similar to the one DeSoto planned, with statute miles our units of "legal" measure. That land titling concept was inherited from the Romans and was applied to all New World Colonies by both Spanish and English speaking governments.
DeSoto's people knew that he could claim lands directly inland of only two hundred leagues of coast for his colony, and that they could claim lands only within his colony's boundaries. They kept track of desirable homesteads, usually Indian Villages, in their personal journals and thereby described the army's movements for us. They recorded direction of march and league measure (5,000 paces per league) between landmarks; no other reference points existed to guide them back to those places once Desoto selected his colony.
Our rivers, mountains, plains, shorelines and pastures have not formed or moved since DeSoto was here, and roads between them follow the same Indian trails that DeSoto traveled. Modern maps allow us to follow DeSoto's people's directions between America's landmarks along those trails with reasonable accuracy, but only if we start where their journals began in America; at DeSoto's landing place in Florida.
Pasture lands were critical to conquest. DeSoto's army had over 200 horses, each requiring adequate food every day. Horses were so important to DeSoto's mission - he used them to raid Indian villages for their food, and captives to carry it - that pasture lands or Indian villages with stored food were always DeSoto's intermediate destinations. But Native Americans had no horses; their lifestyles simply were not accommodating to DeSoto's army of over 600 men and 200 horses.
To make allowance for this, DeSoto marched his army in six divisions; each camped separately on open fields or Indian clearings. His army was strewn across the landscape as it advanced, their campsites often at great interval. Horsemen provided intelligence for selecting desirable campsites for each division then "posted" DeSoto's marching orders accordingly. Horses were kept fit and Captains were kept aware of the proximity of other divisions in case of attack. Accurate distance measure was DeSoto's key to these ends and would serve as the foundation of land title once his planned colony was established. Scientists have NOT applied these important concepts, on a day by day basis, while attempting to track DeSoto's army.
DeSoto's ambition, to push his army rapidly overland, at 6 leagues (15 miles) the first day and 5 (13 miles) the second from his landing place in Florida, proved to be more than they could sustain. His army averaged just over four-and-a-half leagues (about 12 miles) each day on the road most of the way from Florida; 5 days on the road and 2 at rest; 60 miles per week as a rule. Below Gadsden, Alabama, approaching Mabila, "they marched 5 or 6 leagues (13 to 16 miles) daily when going through a peopled region, and as much as we could through a depopulated area..." That pace was necessary given the approaching Winter. The climate was much cooler then, and food was hard to find in that region.
Moon phases were also critical to DeSoto's marching schedule. He had only wood for fires and wood could not be easily carried to artificially light his army's way after sunset. They marched only during the day or under a Full Moon - not at all during stormy weather. Midnight raids on unsuspecting Indian villages, DeSoto's proven tactic in Peru and Central America, were out of the question except on or near Full Moon with open skies. Likewise, DeSoto's scouts were limited in the distance they could explore beyond reinforcement at night in hostile Indian territory unless the moon was full. The timing of the moon's phases during DeSoto's Conquest was completely neglected by ALL DeSoto Trail seekers until this report was published in 1995.
Alabama's Tuscalusa Indians were the boldest DeSoto encountered. Chief Tuscalusa knew that DeSoto was coming months before he arrived. DeSoto was headed for his ships - waiting at Mobile Bay with more soldiers, weapons, clothing and food - just three days down the Alabama River from Mabila, Tuscalusa's stronghold. Spaniards found barren fields in that neighborhood; the natives had cleared them (twenty years later, Tristan de Luna, another Spanish Conquistador, would experience the same hardship at the same place for the same reason). DeSoto chose to proceed through Tuscalusa's Province on the Full Moon, but Tuscalusa attacked him at Mabila - despite overwhelming odds against him. The Spaniards lingered near Mabila to recover. They lost nearly everything to fires in that battle.
DeSoto's eventual flight, away from Mabila, to preclude news of his "defeat" from reaching his ships at Mobile Harbor also occurred on the full moon. Any deserter from his army could spoil his plans to colonize North America among prospective settlers with news of America's hardships. DeSoto was careful not to lose track of anyone. He prevented all of them - be they officer, wounded, fit, slave, woman or friendly native - from straying away from his clustered army. He planned to keep them together until they were isolated beyond a natural barrier, deep in America's Interior, for that Winter; then march them farther north in the Spring. The ships would be gone by then, back to Cuba. They would return the following year, as DeSoto had instructed them to do in such an event, when he could give them good news of conquest.
DeSoto's Trail led northward from Mabila. The testimony of survivors follows...