
by Donald E. Sheppard"The land was flat and suitable for the Christians to profit thereby (a square plain, twelve miles long and wide, extends northward from Lawrenceburg and Davy Crockett State Park toward Natchez Trace - the road to Alabamu Province). Some Indians were captured (over the preceding several months), from whom the governor got information relative to the land beyond. On April 25th (1541; the day before New Moon), he left Chicasa and went to sleep at a small village called Alibamu (the army marched four-and-a-half leagues, twelve miles, across Lawrenceburg's plain and camped at its northwest end). It had very little corn and it was necessary after leaving there to commit themselves to an unpopulated region for seven days' journey (84 miles at their normal marching rate of 12 miles per day). Next day (while the army gathered what food remained), the governor sent three captains with horse and foot, each one taking a different direction, to search out provisions in order to cross the unpopulated region (the land is broken and poor for that distance north to the Cumberland River). Juan de Anasco, the accountant, went with fifteen horse and forty foot along the road where the governor was to go (north), and found a strong stockade where the Indians were waiting (at the plain's northern opening to Natchez Trace). ©University of Alabama Press
The LOCATION of Fortress Alabamu, where the Indians chose to attack DeSoto's army, is worthy of note. Three accounts of that event follow; two are first-hand and one, the last, is based on interviews with survivors. The first account: "Here something happened to us that they say has never happened in the Indies, which was that in the middle of the road where we were to pass, without having food to defend nor women to guard there, but rather only to prove themselves against us, they made a very strong barricade of poles in the middle of the road, and about three hundred Indians placed themselves there, with determination to die before they relinquished it. As they saw us appear, some Indians came forth from the barricade to shoot arrows at us and threaten us that no man would remain alive. From this we considered that barricade differently, and with the people that defended it, we believed they had some food there or something that they were guarding, of which we had much need, because we were expecting to cross an uninhabited region of twelve days' duration, in all of which there was not one thing to eat, except what we carried there. About forty of us dismounted and placed ourselves on two sides, so that at the sound of a trumpet we would charge the barricade all at once. We did it thus and entered, although we suffered some damage, for they killed seven or eight men and wounded twenty-five or twenty-six of us. We captured some Indians and others we killed, and we found out from them that they had done that only with the intent of proving themselves against us, and for no other purpose. We looked for food there, although with difficulty, in order to enter into our inhabited region."
The second account: "As soon as they saw the Christians approach, with loud cries and beating two drums, they came out in great fury to meet us. It seemed best to Juan de Anasco and those with him to keep away from them and to inform the governor. He withdrew over a level ground for the distance of a crossbow flight from the barricade and in sight of it. The men of foot, the crossbowmen and those having shields placed themselves before the horsemen so that the horses might not be wounded. The Indians came out by sevens and eights to shoot their arrows and then to retire. In sight of the Christians, they made a fire and seized an Indian - by the feet and head - and pretended they were going to throw him into the fire, first giving him many blows on the head, signifying what they would do to the Christians. Juan de Anasco sent three horse to inform the governor. The latter came immediately, and since he thought he should drive them thence, saying that if he did not do so they would become embolden to attack him at a time when they could do him more hurt, he ordered the horsemen to dismount and having divided them into four companies gave the signal and they attacked the Indians. The latter resisted until the Christians reached the barricade; and as soon as they saw that they could not defend themselves they fled along a way where a stream flowed near the barricade, and from the other shore shot some arrows. And inasmuch as no crossing was found for the horses for the time being, they had time to get away. Three Indians were killed there, and many Christians were wounded, fifteen of whom died on the march a few days later. It seemed to all that the governor was much to blame in not having had an examination made of the disposition of the land which lay on the other side of the stream and of ascertaining the crossing (place) before attacking them..."
The last account:"...having marched on the first day (from Lawrenceburg) four leagues through a level country dotted with many small villages having fifteen or twenty houses, they passed a quarter of a league (just over half-a-mile) beyond the inhabited region... When the Spaniards halted to make camp in that field they sent cavalry (horsemen) to scour the country on every side and see what was all around the camp. They returned with the information that nearby was a fort built of wood, manned by very select warriors... They had bridges over the river made of wood, but so shaky and ruinous that they could hardly pass over them... (the battle is described here, until)... they (the Indians) abandoned the fort within a short time, and those who were able to cross the river, now being safe (from the Spaniards on the near bank), formed themselves into a squadron. Our men remained on this side... DeSoto, who was desirous of punishing those Indians for their impudence and audacity, calling to the mounted men and crossing the river by a good ford that was above the fort, drove them forward across a plain for more than a league, spearing them all if they had not been overtaken by darkness..."
That PLACE still exists: Traveling twelve miles northwest from Davy Crockett's Homestead at Lawrenceburg, we pass broad fields until reaching the end of the plain where DeSoto's army camped. There the land becomes hilly and broken except at Buffalo Creek, which flows northwest from the plain into Buffalo River. Indian trails followed that creek and river to Natchez Trace and today's Nashville, the home of the Alabamu Indians. DeSoto planned to raid their homes for food but had no guides to lead him there; the captives had died of starvation and exposure that winter. Approaching Buffalo Creek from the plain, however, a broad pasture on Buffalo Creek's west shore invites anyone to proceed through it between steep hills on either side. As one precedes, however, Buffalo Creek enters a muddy ravine, the pasture narrows and the land inclines up a steep hill behind which Buffalo Creek bends west and cuts the hill's backside into steep cliffs. A broad pasture can be seen on the opposite bank from the cliffs, but, to get there, and all points northward, one must back-track to where DeSoto's army camped, turn east, cross Buffalo Creek at a sandy ford which is hidden by the creek's forest (where it is bridged today), then follow the creek's east bank several miles north to the creek's ravine and pasture beyond the cliffs, the way the Indians knew how to get to Nashville.
Alabamu barricade was located at the foot of the hill at the north end of Buffalo Creek's west bank, just out of view of the army's camp at the north end of Lawrenceburg's plain. The Spaniards were enticed up that side of Buffalo Creek, the wrong side. DeSoto's scouts would have discovered that had the Alabamu Indians not prevented their passage. After the army attacked, the Alabamu Indians escaped up the hill to the cliffs. They crossed the creek's ravine on an inclined bridge to the north shore pasture, then headed for home. The Spaniards had to go back to their camp to find the ford (where the bridge is today) which would lead them to the creek's pasture north of the cliffs. The Indians were gone by the time the Spaniards arrived north of the cliffs at dark, with no moon. DeSoto resolved not to chase them to Nashville; he had more important things to do. He headed northwest, toward Quizqui (Casqui, the way Frenchmen would spell it), toward his objective: the Indians' Legendary Northern Sea. DeSoto's humiliation by the Alabamu Indians at the barricade must have been cause for local celebration. Buffalo Creek's westside pasture, just south of the cliffs, is marked by a large earthen mound at the spot where DeSoto's army found the barricade. Perhaps that place became famous for deceiving DeSoto's Great Army.

DeSoto perceived that the rivers flow northward from Lawrenceburg's plain and surmised that the north shore of this "Island of Florida" lay just ahead. Along the way, the rivers continued to flow northward until he reached the Ohio River, twelve marching days up the trail - 170 miles from Alabamu barricade. The army marched five leagues (14 miles) per day to the Cumberland River; they had little left to carry and their pigs were few in number. DeSoto didn't worry about deserters any more, he knew his army would catch up or die in hostile Indian Country. "On Saturday, the last day of April (1541), the army departed from the site of the barricade and traveled nine days (seven on the road for most of them) through an uninhabited region (up today's Highway 48; the Indians of Hohenwald, Centerville and Dickson fled before them) and a bad road through forests and swamps (at Duck and Cumberland Rivers) until Sunday the eight of May, when they arrived at the first town of Quizqui (Clarksville); and they took them unexpectedly (under a nearly Full Moon) and captured many people (women and children) and cloths (probably during a dawn raid)..." DeSoto had stayed too long in Chicasa; April showers probably kept him there, which would account for the army's complaint about bad roads and swamps beyond. The trail north from Alabamu Barricade led through narrow valleys and creek bed forests; horseback warfare's worst scenario.
DeSoto crossed the Cumberland River just east of today's Highway 48 Bridge below Clarksville; the only place on that river's run with no high bluffs on either side. That fording place, on the Indian trail which DeSoto followed from Lawrenceburg, would become a ferry crossing before the Civil War. Union soldiers would cross there, too, but headed down the trail. DeSoto found a village at Clarksville: "He reached the town of Quizquiz without being perceived. He seized all the people of the town (women and children) before they got out of their houses (the men were in the fields at the time)... Inasmuch as his men were ill and weary for lack of corn, and the horses were also weak, DeSoto determined to (try to get along when the Indian men returned on news of his invasion)... So he ordered the (Chief's) mother and all the others released, and sent them with words of kindness... many Indians came with their bows and arrows with intention of attacking the Christians. The governor ordered all the horsemen to be armed and mounted (Indians had never seen such weapons of war)... When the Indians saw that we were on guard (with overwhelming strength) they stopped a crossbow flight from the spot where the governor was, near a stream (they stopped near the Cumberland River's ravine just west of today's Clarksville; well back from the horsemen)... and said they came to see what people we were and that they had learned from their ancestors that a white race would inevitably subdue them... and after offering skins and blankets... together with the others who were waiting on the shore, returned (to their canoes: DeSoto had performed dramatic shows of force elsewhere to intimidate the natives). Inasmuch as there was little corn in the town where the governor was, he moved to another..."
"One league from this town was found another (New Providence) with much corn, and then, after another league, another, likewise with much corn (in the flats of today's Fort Campbell Army Airport at the Tennessee-Kentucky State Line)."